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As the opioid crisis continues to claim lives throughout the U.S., tort litigants 
have faced challenges pursuing Purdue Pharma – one of the drug makers 
responsible for aggressively promoting OxyContin while downplaying the 
drug’s addictive effects. Much of this litigation posture sought to recover 
billions in public health costs incurred responding to the crisis at federal, state 
and local levels. As the plaintiff class grew, Purdue Pharma petitioned for 
bankruptcy protection, at which point auditors discovered the entity’s beneficial 
owners had caused it to wire billions in opioid profits into offshore accounts – 
placing them beyond the reach of litigants. These transactions reveal the limits 
of domestic financial reporting regulations and international regulatory bodies, 
like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), whose frameworks narrowly focus 
on intercepting proceeds of terrorism and money laundering. 
Existing scholarship has not considered why the offshoring of opioid revenues 
remains legal in a regulatory landscape conceived to protect the common good. 
The soft-law system of norm-building responsible for building these frameworks 
would best fulfill its purpose by broadening its reach to include a wider sweep 
of capital mobility. The opioid crisis offers a useful context for exploring this 
claim. By devising a class of activity – described below as the Public Interest 
Transaction (PIT) – modified FATF rules would offer a principles-based 
alternative to the existing system’s language and provide a pathway for 
intercepting a wider variety of capital mobility with an emphasis on profits 
derived from “high casualty” crises such as the opioid crises. By precluding 
language that targets other forms of publicly harmful transactions, existing 
norms will continue to undermine the public good in a transnational banking 
environment lacking more principles-based approaches to financial regulation. 
The timing and context of Purdue Pharma’s wire transfers offer a useful 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Opioid addictions have cost thousands of American lives, billions in 
public health expenditures, as well as destruction to both families and 
communities across the United States. As this crisis unfolded, Purdue 
Pharma (Purdue)—the drug maker responsible for aggressively promoting 
and selling OxyContin—and its beneficial owners, the Sackler family, 
found themselves facing a rising tide of tort claims from across the country 
seeking to recoup public health costs associated with responding to the 
opioid epidemic.1 The resulting mass tort claims were ultimately 
consolidated into multi-district proceedings, prompting Purdue and the 
Sacklers to begin settlement negotiations.2 During these negotiations, 
outside auditors discovered the Sacklers caused Purdue to wire billions out 
of the country and into offshore financial centers, accelerating the pace of 
these transactions, which represented a far greater sum than amounts 
offered to plaintiffs during settlement talks.3 
This Article uses these wire transfers to question the efficacy of 
existing international financial regulatory bodies such as the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF). It argues that the soft law norms used to 
promulgate FATF standards are insufficient to protect the public interest; 
that American regulations demonstrate how existing laws in FATF member 
countries sustain a regulatory climate that continues to support problematic 
forms of capital flight; and that creating a new regulatory class of Public 
Interest Transactions (PIT) targeting a wider species of wire transfers is in 
keeping with the FATF’s purpose. Absent an aspirational regime that 
confronts gaps in our international financial regulatory systems, domestic 
and transnational norms will undermine efforts to seek redress on behalf of 
those harmed by actors such as Purdue and the Sacklers. 
Had the Sacklers been street-level drug pushers or terrorists 
responsible for tens of thousands of deaths, there is little doubt they would 
have been prosecuted, jailed, and subject to asset seizure. Ironically, over 
the same period of time that banking institutions were being asked to refine 
reporting rules that would help governments seize proceeds of crime, at 
least a dozen worked with Purdue’s beneficial owners’ offshore capital 
under circumstances substantively adjacent to the FATF’s work. 
Given their timing and context, the Purdue–Sackler wire transfers are a 
prototypical example of a globalized problem that awaits a globalized 
solution. With modest changes, the FATF is best suited to regulate such 
capital flows, given its mandate and infrastructure. This Article explains 
how to institute such changes. 
This Article uses the opioid crisis and the history of the FATF to 
explore ways to improve international financial regulatory networks and 
 
 1 See infra Part IV. 
 2 See infra Part IV. 
 3 See infra Part IV. 
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widen their surveillance standards to include transactions in which the 
public has a significant interest. While these two subject areas may seem 
unrelated, early phases of the opioid crisis generated enormous profits for 
the healthcare industry at a time when the United States and other countries 
were working through international financial regulatory networks to target 
the proceeds of crime and, eventually, terrorist-related finance. Purdue and 
its beneficial owners—the Sackler family—were among those whose 
fortunes grew before widespread use of their products played a role in a 
substance abuse epidemic that continues to cost lives.4 Over decades, key 
members of the family used American financial institutions to wire 
Purdue’s profits to offshore entities under their control.5 During this same 
period, U.S. representatives were actively working through the FATF to 
globalize financial surveillance norms.6 The offshoring of opioid proceeds 
illustrates how informal rulemaking paradigms did not sufficiently account 
for the classes of transactions and parties warranting enhanced scrutiny at 
critical times. 
Early in the FATF’s history, its member states used the “talking shop” 
model of engagement and rulemaking because it was thought to be well-
suited to the exigencies of international regulatory networks.7 This Article 
looks to the work of David Zaring, whose writings have explored the merits 
of states working through a network of global institutions to steer the 
behavior of financial intermediaries without purporting to act with the force 
of law.8 Zaring advances the claim that the “talking shop” model would 
bring flexibility to transnational financial networks and help stabilize 
country economies.9 Recognizing the absence of a global financial 
regulatory authority with the jurisdiction to promulgate and enforce binding 
rules, “talking shop” cedes responsibility for governance and rulemaking 
functions to venues where behavioral norms emerge out of a shared body of 
informal understandings.10 
There is no commonly shared definition of soft law or of the features 
linking its connection to “talking shop” as a form of lawmaking.11 In 
 
 4 See infra Part IV. 
 5 See infra Part IV. “Offshore financial centers” are also referred to as “tax havens” and 
“secrecy jurisdictions.” This Article uses these terms interchangeably. 
 6 See infra Parts III & IV. 
 7 David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation, 52 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 683 (2012) [hereinafter Zaring, Finding Legal Principle]. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. See also Timothy Meyer, Soft Law as Delegation, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 888–89 
(2008) [hereinafter Meyer]. 
 11 See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 174 (2010) [hereinafter Guzman & Meyer] (“. . . we opt to define soft 
law in a way that is closer to the doctrinal approach, both because it is the more common 
definition, focusing on differences in legality rather than all the design features that affect 
compliance, and because it turns out to be more useful for the analysis we undertake.”). 
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governance and regulatory spheres, it refers to informal discourses among 
parties who have chosen to develop shared customs through informality 
rather than through formal processes.12 Scholarly views of soft law’s 
practical merits vary. While some authors generally favor the concept,13 
others have expressed faith in its capacity to constrain behavior just as 
effectively as formal obligations.14 These arguments contrast with 
commentary questioning whether soft law should be called “law” at all.15 
Taken together, much of this discourse is commonly positioned in relation 
to hard law’s more formal features.16 
There is sound logic in marrying domestic and international forms of 
rulemaking in financial sectors. These exercises unfold under the aegis of 
international organizations formed to serve as networked gathering points 
where participants recognize a pragmatic need to produce effective norms 
through cooperation.17 Globalization has produced important concerns for 
 
 12 Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities 
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 884 (2009) [hereinafter Karmel & Kelly] (discussing 
expressions of soft law within self-regulatory organizations). 
 13 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 196 (1st ed. 2004) (arguing that the 
fear of lost reputational standing through “social and professional opprobrium” moves 
national regulators to support trans-governmental networks); Meyer, supra note 10, at 889 
(generally lauding Basel Accords (or Basel I and Basel II) and the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision as important non-binding legal agreements). 
 14 Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 
61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 575 (2008) (arguing that soft law arrangements “can ultimately have 
real effect by working their way into customary international law or by providing the 
framework for information interstate cooperation”); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, 
International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 113, 116 (2003) 
[hereinafter Goldsmith & Posner] (identifying important examples of informal rulemaking, 
such as quota agreements generated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 1)); Karmel & Kelly, supra note 12, 
at 884 (generally discussing how soft law within the framework of self-regulatory 
organizations can harden law when it is incorporated into statutes, regulations, and even 
treaties). 
 15 Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 14, at 114 n.2 (arguing there is no sense calling 
“nonlegal” or non-binding instruments “law”); Brian Sheppard, Norm Supercompliance and 
the Status of Soft Law, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 787, 789 (2014) (“The strangeness of soft law has 
led many to question whether it makes sense at all.”). 
 16 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422 (2000) (“We use the shorthand term soft law to 
distinguish this broad class of deviations from hard law and, at the other extreme, from 
purely political arrangements in which legalization is largely absent.”); Waliul Hasanat, Soft-
Law Cooperation in International Law: The Arctic Council’s Efforts to Address Climate 
Change, 23 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 519-20 (2012–2013) (arguing “there is a need to keep 
studying these new cooperation structures even if they do not clearly fit within the traditional 
confines of international law”). 
 17 Meyer, supra note 10, at 889; Matthew C. Turk, Reframing International Financial 
Regulation after the Global Financial Crisis: Regional States and Interdependence, Not 
Regulatory Networks and Soft Law, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 59, 77 (2014) [hereinafter Turk] 
(arguing that “Interdependence problems . . . present opportunities for states to develop 
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domestic financial regulators who cannot give full effect to enforcement 
goals beyond their borders and into an international landscape fraught with 
systemic risk.18 This limitation makes the globalizing of financial regulation 
both pragmatic and difficult.19 Working through non-binding international 
organizations to engender cooperation among a network of regulators offers 
the hope of harmonizing norms that give rogue actors nowhere to hide their 
capital.20 
This Article asserts that the FATF’s networked participants and their 
transnational spaces have left important work unfinished to the extent that 
private actors continue placing their assets offshore and beyond the reach of 
public interest litigants in times of crisis. The following discussion also 
argues that the most relevant transnational networks have fallen short in 
addressing particular classes of public interest concerns and that the design 
and function of these multilateral entities fall short of their goals by failing 
to capture a sufficiently broad range of regulatory targets. 
Parts of this Article bring elements of Zaring’s work into 
contemporary payment spaces and make the claim that particular 
expressions of public interest considerations have yet to find a much-
needed place within the same transnational networks used by participating 
states to pollinate domestic policy. Zaring’s framework envisions how state 
agents form financial regulatory networks, and how the core features of 
these networks offer no more uncertainty than more formalized, treaty-
based rulemaking.21 These principles include: (i) a principle for national 
treatment; (ii) a most favored nation principle; (iii) an inclination toward 
rulemaking instead of adjudication; (iv) a subsidiary principle of 
enforcement; (v) enforcement through peer-review; and (vi) a network 
model of institutionalization.22 Aided by an interdisciplinary body of 
scholarship, this Article applies Zaring’s framework to the strategic outflow 
of opioid proceeds from the United States over a twenty-year period ending 
in 2018. 
Payment systems are not amoral insofar as they serve as the 
connective tissue mediating relationships between the state and its subjects 
while revealing the condition of our modern political economy.23 The 
 
cooperative arrangements that discourage negative spillovers or encourage positive 
spillovers in ways that can benefit all parties involved.”). 
 18 Zaring, Finding Legal Principle, supra note 7, at 689. 
 19 Id.; Turk, supra note 17, at 63 (arguing that soft law developments after the 2008 
financial crisis may streamline cross-border finance while still struggling to reduce financial 
instability). 
 20 Zaring, Finding Legal Principle, supra note 7, at 689. 
 21 Id. at 686. 
 22 Id. at 685. 
 23 See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: 
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (generally discussing how 
payment systems were shaped by laws, regulations, pressure, and notions of corporate 
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present discussion considers two aspects of payment infrastructure. The 
first services modern commerce, usually inside financial institutions 
facilitating the transfer of funds in connection with every conceivable 
transaction. The second function is tethered to the governmental exercise of 
determining individual participants’ financial contribution to the common 
good, capturing revenues and deploying public resources in accordance 
with established priorities. The state finds important expressions of power 
through making decisions about how to distribute social costs among its 
various constituents who, in turn, fashion a range of behaviors in response 
to demands that their contributions be commensurate with their wealth.24 
State and private actors position themselves in relation to choices 
about resource allocation through their selective support of institutions, 
individuals, operating rules, industry standards, and technologies that 
support the transfer of monetary value.25 Fields such as taxation26 and 
securities regulation27 are the prototypical contexts in which actors’ 
interests within modern payment spaces diverge—with governments 
preferring norms that require traceable movements of money28 and private 
actors favoring financial secrecy to the extent covert transactions advance 
 
responsibility as part of an effort to regulate illegal behavior). 
 24 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy 89 NW. U. L. 
REV. 4 (1994) (generally discussing how governments can account for well-being when 
making decisions about resource allocation); Sanford M. Jacoby, Finance and Labor: 
Perspectives on Risk, Inequality, and Democracy, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 17-18 (2008) 
(arguing that coalitions of “middle-class consumers, farmers, small business, and organized 
labor” have the power to influence wealth distribution when they succeed in challenging 
“the economic and political significance of finance”); William A. Lovett, Transnational 
Finance Regulation and the Global Economy, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 43, 59 (2011). 
(“Sovereign states have primary roles in framing government tax revenues, budget 
allocations, and the use of deficits (or surplus) as a part of national finance.”). 
 25 See generally Mark Edwin Burge, Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs of 
Future Public Payments Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1493 (2016); Gary W. Lorenz, Electronic 
Stored Value Payment Systems, Market Position, and Regulatory Issues, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 
1177 (1997). 
 26 See generally U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/AFMD-85-56 1 (1985-09-30) 
Federal Accounting and Auditing Standards Affecting the Private Sector. 
 27 Daniel L. Goelzer & Anne Sullivan, Obtaining Evidence for the International 
Enforcement of the United States Securities Laws, 16 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 145-47 (1990) 
(describing how U.S. securities regulators must supplement various treaties and international 
agreements by relying on memoranda of understanding to obtain help from foreign 
governments). 
 28 Peter P. Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government 
Surveillance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 485 (1999) [hereinafter Swire] (“The government has a 
strong interest in receiving data relevant to its own financial affairs, such as collection of 
taxes and distribution of benefits. It also has a strong interest in receiving data to deter, 
detect, and punish violations of law. These two interests combine in enforcement against tax 
evasion and benefits fraud. Along with this criminal and civil enforcement, money 
laundering laws, with their emphasis on ‘following the money trail,’ turn out to be at the 
heart of modem government demands to greater access to financial records.”). 
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commercial interests and limit wider social scrutiny.29 Predictably, these 
competing interests account for some of the disagreement as to the proper 
scope of public law’s presence within modern financial regulation within 
and across borders.30 
Amidst these arguments, financial institutions remain vital actors in 
our modern payment ecologies. They quietly do the work of transferring 
value in ostensibly amoral processes that nonetheless allocate resources in 
profound and consequential ways. Commentary in the popular press and 
scholarly writings is replete with narratives catering to perceptions that 
political and economic elites enjoy seemingly limitless power to 
commandeer control over state institutions and public resource allocation 
while reducing the scope of their commitment to the social contract.31 
Published stories about the continued and controversial use of offshore 
financial services catering to wealthy clients coexist with conversations 
about barriers to socioeconomic mobility,32 the sustainability of social 
welfare commitments,33 and a hardening of attitudes towards 
 
 29 Arthur J. Cockfield, How Countries Should Share Tax Information, 50 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1091, 1097 (2017) [hereinafter Cockfield, How Countries Should Share] 
(discussing how “[t]axpayers engaged in offshore tax evasion and international money 
laundering clearly prefer the status quo, which makes it difficult or impossible for authorities 
to investigate and track their criminal activities”); Antoine P. Martin, Coordinating Modern 
Cross-Border Financial Services: No Global Policy, No Global Legal Framework, but Some 
Regional Opportunities, 50 INT’L LAW. 467, 470 (2017) (arguing countries have pursued 
heavy regulation of financial services at the cost of missing opportunities to streamline 
them). 
 30 Cockfield, How Countries Should Share, supra note 29. See also Mariano-Florentino 
Cuellar, The Tenuous Relationship between the Fight against Money Laundering and the 
Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 312 (2003) (arguing 
that “major players involved in running the system—including legislators, prosecutors, 
investigators, and regulators—face a tangle of incentives” that leave our financial and law 
enforcement systems ill-suited to disrupting the “larger universe of criminal financial 
activity”). 
 31 Arthur J. Cockfield, Shaping International Tax Law and Policy in Challenging Times, 
54 STAN. J. INT’L L. 223, 224, 226 (2018) [hereinafter Cockfield, Shaping] (discussing how 
media revelations about the Panama Papers and the Paradise Papers reinforce the popular 
perception that the “‘system is rigged’ in favor of wealthy and powerful individuals, and 
against average citizens”); International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Panama 
Papers: Explore the Panama Papers Key Figures, ICIJ, (Jan. 31, 2017) https://www.icij.org/ 
investigations/panama-papers/explore-panama-papers-key-figures/ [https://perma.cc/8ETD-
X8R6]. 
 32 Cockfield, Shaping, supra note 31; Michael Forsythe, Paradise Papers Shine Light on 
Where the Elite Keep Their Money, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/11/05/world/paradise-papers.html [perma.cc/TC52-N3G5]; Karl M. F. Lockhart, 
Investment Treaties, Offshore Finance, and the Resource Curse, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2663 
(2018). 
 33 Sara Dillon, Tax Avoidance, Revenue Starvation and the Age of the Multinational 
Corporation, 50 INT’L LAW. 275, 276 (2017) (exploring the degree to which any mandatory 
obligation for corporations to contribute to the common good no longer exists and 
corresponding demand for offshoring taxable revenue). 




Modern statehood depends on the surveillance of capital mobility and, 
by extension, a set of relationships with financial institutions.35 These 
arrangements have grown out of hard and soft law norms,36 multilateral 
processes such as economic sanctions, currency controls, and other forms of 
economic statecraft coexisting with soft power emerging from the “talking 
shop” paradigm.37 As discussed below, financial institutions participate in 
the project of networked regulation while serving their clients’ interests, 
which means they exist in legal environments where they must serve two 
masters.38 
Part II of this Article uses a selection of literature to explain network 
theory’s relevance to existing conversations about transnational regulation. 
This scholarship illustrates the domestic regulatory appetite for working 
through networks to develop consensus-based, nonbinding norms within 
spaces that also obscure points of contact between hard and soft law. It also 
recognizes the complexities inherent in locating similar points of contact in 
modern payment spaces by virtue of their structure and function, which 
serve to support capital mobility and modern commerce more broadly. Part 
II nonetheless treats transnational regulatory networks, their processes, and 
outcomes as generating particular expressions of soft law that merely reflect 
dominant participants’ priorities. It also asserts that the “talking shop” 
model will always struggle to represent the fullest expressions of public 
interest. 
Part III applies the foregoing themes to the FATF, a prototypical 
transnational regulatory network that has played a role in globalizing 
financial reporting standards. It also discusses how American regulators 
 
 34 Cockfield, Shaping, supra note 31, at 224, 226; James F. Hollifield, Migration, Trade, 
and the Nation-State: The Myth of Globalization, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 595, 597, 
623 (1998) (discussing links between Free Trade and increased migration, the reversal of 
which would stoke racism and xenophobia). See also Jennifer Fitzgerald, David Leblang & 
Jessica C. Teets, Defying the Law of Gravity: The Political Economy of International 
Migration, 66 WORLD POL. 406 (2014). 
 35 Swire, supra note 28, at 485. For a more restrained approach to governments 
deputizing private institutions based on a “make or buy” calculation, see Cristie Ford, 
Macro- and Micro-Level Effects on Responsive Financial Regulation, 44 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. 
REV. 589, 592 (2011) (“. . . [E]nforced self-regulation and other process-based regulatory 
approaches would benefit from building in, at a structural level, greater attention to both 
‘macro’ forces, such as the background influence of power, and ‘micro’ forces, such as the 
form, nature, and drivers of incremental change within the interstices of any flexible 
regulatory process”); Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Governmental Regulation, 53 DUKE 
L.J. 389, 400 (2003). 
 36 Guzman & Meyer, supra note 11, at 174. 
 37 Id. This Article adopts two complementary treatments of soft law. One evinces a set 
of promises or statements that fall short of hard law despite being “law-like.” The other is a 
principles-based concept that considers the extent to which devised rules will likely restrain 
or compel participant conduct. 
 38 See infra Parts III & IV. 
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worked through these bodies to globalize domestic priorities, especially in 
response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11). In each 
instance, these efforts purported to demonstrate public interest concerns, 
only to stop short of fulfilling the broadest commitment to such principles 
where they competed with hegemonic behavior or expressions of self-
interest. This Part of the Article exposes some of the inherent limits of a 
“talking shop” system of transnational regulation—particularly those that 
conceal the precise moments when subjugation of public interest occurs. 
Part IV offers an example of this subordinated public interest by 
summarizing precursors to the opioid crisis and by placing this history 
alongside contemporary phases of the FATF’s institutional evolution. It 
describes an overview of opioids, their capacity to treat pain, and the 
growing demand for pain management solutions that began in the 1990s. 
Part IV of the Article goes on to describe how Purdue engaged in deceptive 
marketing practices to further stoke demand for OxyContin, which, in turn, 
prompted a sharp increase in both sales and revenues. During these years, 
several banking institutions helped the Sacklers execute over 800 wire 
transfers into family-controlled entities that were either offshore or routed 
through Swiss bank accounts. The wire transfers continued for decades—
overlapping with a period of time when the FATF was aggressively 
pressuring countries to harmonize financial surveillance norms. The banks 
that participated in these transactions were themselves adhering to 
increasingly stringent reporting obligations over a twenty-year period. Part 
IV concludes by arguing that U.S. regulators, working through international 
financial regulatory networks, underutilized their “talking shop” powers at 
critical times and in ways that would undermine their domestic, state-level 
counterparts seeking compensation for the amounts spent responding to the 
opioid crisis. This failure of FATF member countries to use networked 
power and soft law effectively gave cover to the smaller networks of private 
actors, banks, and offshore financial centers that sheltered assets in places 
where opioid litigants—who were mostly government plaintiffs—could not 
reach them. 
Part V imagines what FATF standards might look like had the FATF 
been more purposive in their design and application. It explores the options 
of creating a new class of “public interest transactions” or “politically 
exposed persons” whose transactions warrant closer scrutiny once certain 
triggering events occur. It contemplates how American regulation might 
have responded to the wire transfers from Purdue to its beneficial owners 
had different FATF standards been reflected in U.S. law at any time in the 
past twenty years. The Article concludes with a note of pessimism about the 
prospect of new standards, particularly in light of America’s recent track 
record of disengagement from multilateral institutions and a general 
preference for financial deregulation. 
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II. NETWORKS AS A VEHICLE FOR GOVERNANCE AND 
REGULATION 
A. Network Theory as an Organizing Paradigm for Governance and 
Regulation 
Much of the scholarship in global financial regulation uses network 
theory as an analytical device because its lexicon captures the essence of 
modern governance and regulation deployed through transnational spaces.39 
Network theory is a framework used to describe “informal institutions 
linking actors across national boundaries and carrying on various aspects of 
global governance in new and informal ways.”40 On a spectrum of laws, 
regulations, and rules, it is the opposite of statutory law, if it is law at all. It 
is custom devised to fill the void where there are no binding international 
laws, but where banking practices require efficient and predicable transfers 
of capital. A networked world functions above, below, and through states—
it allows for strategic expressions of statehood to operate in more atomized 
and organic ways that are in keeping with networked dialogue.41 Even as 
they separate insiders from outsiders, networks also respond to internal and 
external pressures that do not easily fit within Westphalian frameworks of 
statehood.42 
While they may evolve differently, international networks now 
function in almost every sector of public and private life. For example, 
national securities regulators work to harmonize global regulatory standards 
through The International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) instead of solely relying on their heads of state.43 Central banks 
internationally coordinate their norms through the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision.44 In the private sector, the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) figures prominently in the setting of industry 
norms across thousands of fields.45 
“Networked governance” is not a new concept. Discussions about the 
necessity (and impact) of trans-governmental and transnational relations 
 
 39 See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY: THE INFORMATION AGE, 
ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE (2d. ed. 2000); Mark Bevir & R. A. W. Rhodes, 
Searching for Civil Society: Changing Patterns of Governance in Britain, 81 PUB. ADMIN. 
41 (2003); and Mark Bevir, R. A. W. Rhodes & Patrick Weller, Traditions of Governance: 
Interpreting the Changing Role of the Public Sector, 81 PUB. ADMIN. 1 (2003); Scott C. 
Burris, Peter Drahos & Clifford D. Shearing, Nodal Governance, 30 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 30 
(2005). 
 40 Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update, 2 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI., 211, 215 (2006) [hereinafter Slaughter & Zaring]. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Zaring, Finding Legal Principles, supra, note 7, at 691. 
 44 Id. 
 45 ISO, ISO Today, https://www.iso.org/about-us.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2020). 
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started in the 1970s when scholars argued that asymmetric distribution of 
state powers could not eclipse the growing importance of 
interdependence.46 However, this early commentary challenged theorists to 
consider the possibility of international cooperation without the hegemonic 
influence of American power, which was declining despite its 
significance.47 How would this revised model of cooperation continue 
functioning alongside a range of pre-existing international norms and 
institutions?48 
The ensuing theoretical discourse begat regime theory—the study of 
how actors in a specific policy arena develop their own set of expectations 
based on norms, rules of engagement, and procedures.49 Non-state actors—
corporations and civil society groups—were also acknowledged as 
important constituents within these arenas.50 “Epistemic communities” 
would eventually populate these venues as “a network of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or 
issue area.”51 These communities share four elements: (i) a “shared set of 
normative and principled beliefs” that provides them with a “value-base 
rationale” for undertaking socially-relevant action; (ii) “shared causal 
beliefs” illuminating the underlying relationship between the available 
policies and the preferred outcomes; (iii) “shared notions of validity” that 
are employed to identify admissible knowledge in the subject area of 
concern; and (iv) “a common policy enterprise” that comprises particular 
sets of social issues and the policy instruments ordinarily used to manage 
them within the domain at issue.52 
Networked governance is attractive for several reasons. Expert 
communities and government officials can interact with international peers 
with minimal executive or cabinet-level supervision, and these relationships 
 
 46 See generally ROBERT KEOHANE & JOSEPH NYE, TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND 
WORLD POLITICS (Harvard Univ. Press 1972). See also ROBERT KEOHANE & JOSEPH NYE, 
POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION (Little, Brown 1977); 
Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International 
Organizations, 1 WORLD POLITICS 39, 39–42 (1974). 
 47 See generally ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN 
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (Princeton Univ. Press 1984). 
 48 Id. 
 49 See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Cornell Univ. Press 
1983). 
 50 See generally MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND 
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Cornell Univ. Press 1998); 
Oran R. Young, Rights, Rules, and Resources in World Affairs, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: 
DRAWING INSIGHTS FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERIENCE 1:1–23 (MIT Press 1997). 
 51 See generally Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International 
Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Haas]. 
 52 Id. See also Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 40, at 215. 
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are loosely structured without requiring formal negotiation.53 Peer pressure 
and other membership incentives operate to produce compliance and policy 
convergence.54 Networks also carry the potential to morph into more 
institutional structures with considerable influence.55 This understanding of 
institutions can include a range of informal relationships “consisting of 
norms and rules connecting and constituting recognized roles.”56 
While it is legitimate to acknowledge the de-centering of government 
as a byproduct of globalization, this shift should not be overstated or taken 
to mean state power has been completely neutered. Networks can obscure 
the origins of power while expanding the reach of state influence in positive 
or negative ways, sometimes with a considerable degree of coercion.57 Put 
another way, locating accountability in lightly institutionalized, networked 
spaces is difficult, which may also make them attractive rulemaking venues. 
In his 1997 critique of networked governance, Philip Alston captured this 
complexity in what he saw as a mismatch between networked approaches to 
governance and lingering, Westphalian models of international law: 
State sovereignty is not what it used to be. International lawyers, in 
particular, are acutely aware of the extent to which many of its 
characteristics have changed. But sovereignty is largely an abstraction and 
the developments that have made such an impact upon it are both multi-
faceted and complex. For all its shortcomings, the term “globalization” is 
now the one most commonly used to describe some of them. But despite its 
ubiquity in other disciplines such as economics and political science, it is a 
term, which, at least until very recently, has been accorded little 
prominence in the literature of international law. . . . [This] relative neglect 
is highly problematic in two respects. It reflects a failure to address 
adequately the implications for international law of both the changing 
internal role of the state and the changing nature and structure of the global 
economy.58 
Alston’s primary complaint about governance networks was that 
 
 53 Haas, supra note 51, at 2. 
 54 See Thomas Risse-Kappen, Introduction to BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 
BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
(Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995). See generally Kal Raustiala, The 
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of 
International Law. 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002). 
 55 See generally David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International 
Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 547 (2005). 
 56 See generally William Coleman & Tony Porter, International Institutions, 
Globalisation and Democracy: Assessing the Challenges, 14 GLOBAL SOC’Y 377, 385 
(2000). 
 57 Clifford Shearing, Reflections on the Refusal to Acknowledge Private Governments, 
in JENNIFER WOOD & BENOI ̂T DUPONT DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY AND THE GOVERNANCE OF 
SECURITY 11, 20–23 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006). 
 58 Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and 
Globalization, 8 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 435, 435 (1997). 
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“those with power consolidate it and make the decisions which will 
continue to determine the fate of the excluded.”59 
Turning to regulation as something distinct from governance entails 
considering functions aimed at engineering desired behaviors among 
regulatory subjects. It represents the granular detail that emerges from 
governance structures seeking to animate policy choices through 
rulemaking regimes. Its configurations can vary from well-established 
customs enforced under threat of ostracism to more comprehensive and 
formal systems. Regulatory frameworks typically consist of setting 
standards, prescribing conditions of entry and maintaining good standing, 
and designing remedies for non-compliance. Government’s status as the 
ultimate rule-maker allows it to deploy the full machinery of public law in 
aid of state goals or at the behest of influential lobbyists seeking to assert 
their interests. But state presence is not a definitional requirement. Indeed, 
some of society’s most powerful forms of non-governmental regulation 
exist in the form of “soft law” structures, such as payment and messaging 
protocols.60 
B. Finding Expressions of Public Interest Inside the “Talking Shop’s” 
Relationships with Hard and Soft Law 
In the context of financial regulatory networks, the “talking shop” 
model of rulemaking sits at the intersection of governance, regulation, and 
network theory in action.61 In theory, this produces networked institutions 
with the capacity to support the process of informal rulemaking and non-
binding mandates, but without the resources or legal authority to mimic the 
full power of domestic regulators.62 
While there is nothing to guarantee an equitable movement of 
influence between international financial regulatory bodies and their 
members’ countries—or between member countries—participants have the 
freedom to engineer cooperation through their network of relationships to 
produce desired outcomes.63 These features of international financial 
regulation reflect tensions between the respective proponents of hard and 
soft law in a landscape where states can only control domestic portions of 
 
 59 Id. at 441. 
 60 See, e.g., SWIFT, SWIFT History, https://www.swift.com/about-us/history (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2020) [hereinafter SWIFT]. (The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (SWIFT), supplies institutions around the world with encrypted 
networks that enable the transmission of information linked to financial transactions. SWIFT 
also sells software products and services primarily for use on its network. SWIFT has 
burnished its standing among the global banking community by developing standard 
messaging syntax, which uses a format recognized by a wide range of payment processing 
platforms.). 
 61 Zaring, Finding Legal Principle, supra note 7, at 694. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 14, at 116. 
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an interconnected monetary system where controlling risk demands 
cooperation.64 Soft law’s skeptics question its wider legal value and its 
status as law altogether.65 Yet there are examples of careful adherence to 
powerful soft law arrangements, which arise out of strong mutual interests 
that transcend national borders.66 
International financial regulation’s value as a flexible, permissive 
rulemaking culture also represents its potential limitation. Aspects of 
hortatory institutional signaling and voluntary compliance that work well in 
cooperative climates do not necessarily create alignments between vital 
domestic need and the rulemaking ethos presiding over gatherings of 
international delegates.67 Ideally, public sentiment and the specter of 
reprisals from angry voters might operate to influence this alignment. This 
was certainly the case in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 when a fearful 
American public clamored for political and legislative responses to the 
largely unfamiliar experience of a terrorist attack.68 But international norms 
often come into and out of existence without much opposition from an ill-
informed, unconcerned public lacking the wherewithal to hold their leaders 
accountable.69 Part IV of this Article explores this problem in the context of 
the opioid crisis by casting a light on poorly-scrutinized relationships 
between domestic health conditions, the corporate actors who helped create 
them, and the financial institutions that—amorally or otherwise—supported 
their attempts to escape regulatory accountability. The conversation 
 
 64 Zaring, Finding Legal Principle, supra note 7, at 689. 
 65 Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive 
Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1229–33 (2004) 
(suggesting that the underlying spirit of international law influences compliance with non-
binding rules); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 413, 414 n.7, 414–17 (1983) (arguing informal obligations “are neither soft law nor 
hard law: they are simply not law at all”). 
 66 Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 14, at 116. 
 67 See, e.g., Jason Hoffman & Maegan Vazquez, Trump Announces End of U.S. 
Relationship with the World Health Organization, CNN.COM (May 29, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/29/politics/donald-trump-world-health-
organization/index.html (describing the Trump administration’s decision to end its 
relationship with the World Health Organization as the organization worked with countries 
to find a vaccine for the coronavirus, the outbreak of which caused a global pandemic). 
 68 See generally Kern Alexander, Extraterritorial US Banking Regulation and 
International Terrorism: The Patriot Act and The International Response, 3 J. INT’L 
BANKING REG. 307 (2002) [hereinafter Alexander]. Contra Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and 
Probability Neglect, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121, 121–22 (2003) [hereinafter Sunstein] 
(“As a result of probability neglect, people often are far more concerned about the risks of 
terrorism than about statistically larger risks that they confront in ordinary life. In the context 
of terrorism and analogous risks, the legal system frequently responds to probability neglect, 
resulting in regulation that might be unjustified or even counterproductive.”). See also Nina 
J. Crimm, The Moral Hazard of Anti-terrorism Financing Measures: A Potential to 
Compromise Civil Societies and National Interests, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 577 (2008) 
[hereinafter Crimm]. 
 69 Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 14, at 142. 
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considers how the current design of international financial networks makes 
it possible for regulatory defendants responsible for these crippling 
problems to continue relocating their assets to jurisdictions where 
depository institutions play a role in supporting capital flight. The cross-
border nature of this behavior necessarily implies that any public interest 
considerations in sending and receiving jurisdictions are too narrowly 
defined. This deficiency calls for attention to the places within payment 
landscapes where hard and soft law meet. 
C. Locating Payment Systems Within Financial Regulatory Networks 
Modern commerce relies on payment systems that are reliable. This 
principle is reflected in the premium placed on certainty within payment 
chains, which are primarily concerned with making, supporting, and 
facilitating the transfer of money.70 Financial institutions and transacting 
parties make such transfers possible through adherence to a combination of 
rules, procedures, standards, and payment-processing technologies. Several 
of these rules exist within a comprehensive set of American statutes and 
regulations. These include: uniform commercial law statutes governing 
negotiable instruments, bank deposits, collections, and funds transfers—all 
of which are standard reading for American law students;71 licensing and 
registration requirements for financial institutions in the business of 
transmitting or converting money;72 federal requirements for reporting 
suspicious transactions or currency transactions exceeding prescribed 
amounts;73 federal rules for debit and credit card usage;74 and strict 
reporting obligations for parties importing or exporting currency or 
payment instruments across the U.S. border.75 The foregoing regulations 
co-exist with federal and state banking regulations, which have evolved 
over a century.76 
These laws leave room for powerful soft law systems and other forms 
of private ordering; most of these customs operate within private banking 
networks rather than public ones. For example, the Society for Worldwide 
 
 70 LYNN LOPUCKI, ELIZABETH WARREN, DANIEL KEATING, RONALD J. MANN & ROBERT 
M. LAWLESS, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 335 (5th ed. 2012). 
 71 U.C.C. Art. 3, 4, and 4A (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2005). 
 72 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2006); UNIF. MONEY SERV. ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001). 
 73 Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (alternately called the Currency and Foreign Transactions 
Reporting Act), 84 STAT. 1114-24 (1970). 
 74 Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. 90–321, 82 STAT. 146 (1968) (Title I (15 
U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.) is the Truth in Lending Act. Title IX (15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq.) is the 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act); 12 C.F.R. § 205 (2019); 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2019). 
 75 31 U.S.C. § 5316. 
 76 See generally Gary Gorton, The Development of Opacity in U.S. Banking, 31 YALE J. 
ON REG. 825 (2014) (providing a useful history of American banking); Jerry W. Markham, 
Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N. C. BANKING INST. 221 (2000) (providing 
another useful history of American banking). 
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Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) network’s Business 
Identifier Codes (BICs) use a financial messaging syntax for use over 
SWIFTNet and other payment processing networks.77 Similarly, the credit 
card industry uses contracts to coordinate cardholder-to-merchant payments 
and to allocate overall network operating costs.78 Both of these 
arrangements operate through banks where private and public iterations of 
hard and soft law comingle. For example, private contract terms govern 
elements of consumer credit card processing pursuant to issuer and acquirer 
side agreements.79 But the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) regulates 
particular payment disputes between cardholders and merchants arising 
from the same transaction.80 
Information sharing is an essential element of most payment chains. 
The manner of payment—be it a check, debit card, or wire transfer—uses 
these transactional details to establish the pathway for the money’s 
movement from payor to payee and to determine the terms of settlement 
finality. These requirements also satisfy the broad sweep of reporting 
obligations—particularly where international payments are involved—and 
satisfy underlying policy concerns, such as tax evasion, money laundering, 
and the financing of terrorism.81 For example, a $1,000,000 international 
wire transfer originating from the United States requires compliance with 
Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), a BIC to transmit 
payment messaging information across the SWIFT platform, and the filing 
of a Currency Transaction Report with the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN) under rules refined in the wake of 9/11.82 As is 
discussed in Part III of this Article, U.S. regulators have used surveillance 
programs to monitor these transactions in the name of national security 
while pressuring other FATF member countries to do the same. 
The operation of U.S. payment laws shows how states use 
“informational power” to engage in financial surveillance and to assert 
authority over individuals and organizations seeking to conceal their 
payment practices.83 The data-dependent nature of international banking 
simultaneously suits the needs of globalized governance and regulation.84 
 
 77 SWIFT, supra note 60; SWIFT, SWIFTNet Link, Ensuring Technical Interoperability 
for All Users of SWIFT, https://www.swift.com/our-solutions/interfaces-and-Jintegration/ 
swiftnet-link (last visited Sept. 8, 2020). 
 78 Stephen Wilks, Private Interests, Public Law, and Reconfigured Inequality in Modern 
Payment Card Networks, 123 DICK. L. REV. 307, 316–18 (2019). 
 79 Id. at 318–19. 
 80 TILA § 170(a) (allows consumers to withhold payments to credit card issuers on the 
basis of defenses they can assert to original merchants.). 
 81 See Barry A. K. Rider, Financial Regulation and Supervision After 11th September, 
2001, 10 J. FIN. CRIME 336 (2003). 
 82 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2011). 
 83 Swire, supra note 28, at 485. 
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Both rely on the capacity to quickly gather, secure, assess, and otherwise 
manage large volumes of information.85 The contest between regulators and 
their subjects over disclosure of financial information has emerged as one 
of the most important challenges to power and authority. Systemically 
important banking institutions must reconcile expansive interpretations of 
their regulatory obligations with the interests of serving lucrative and 
systemically problematic clients.86 
To what extent has “talking shop” resolved this conflict of interest or 
made it worse by leaving latitude for placing self-interest ahead of the 
public interests underlying applicable regulations? Part III of this Article 
uses Zaring’s six principles to explore the FATF’s structure and 
effectiveness. 
III. THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE AS A CASE STUDY IN 
NETWORKED FINANCIAL REGULATION 
Formed in 1989 under the aegis of the Organization for Economic 
Development and Cooperation, the FATF developed as a gathering point 
for member countries’ delegates to globalize and implement financial 
reporting norms. Its initial mandate was to develop financial reporting 
standards to combat money laundering.87 The FATF’s creation signaled a 
response to the combined challenges of capital mobility and modern 
technologies.88 These challenges had implications beyond concerns about 
money laundering or tax evasion and raised the spectre of economic 
competition from “more lax” jurisdictions—or offshore financial centers—
offering the commodity of financial secrecy.89 Applying the language of 
network theory, these jurisdictions create nodes of assemblage by attracting 
opportunistic actors seeking jurisdictions where they can operate in ways 
considered illegal elsewhere.90 
Exploring the FATF’s history through Zaring’s six principles reveals 
nuances in the way states use networks to globalize their influence. First, in 
less than a decade, sixteen countries managed to build a networked 
coalition of participants now representing more than 200 jurisdictions.91 
Second, this institutional trajectory demonstrates how the FATF, along with 
its members and constituents, have formed a blend of consensual and 
 
 85 Id. 
 86 Alexander, supra note 68; Crimm, supra note 68; Sunstein, supra note 68. 
 87 FATF, Membership, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/ (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2020). 
 88 Kenneth S. Blazejewski, The FATF and Its Institutional Partners: Improving the 
Effectiveness and Accountability of Transgovernmental Networks, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. 
L.J. 1, 7 n.15 (2008) [hereinafter Blazejewski]. 
 89 Id. at 7. 
 90 Id. 
 91 FATF, Who We Are, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/whoweare/ (last visited Sept. 8, 
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hierarchical relationships to disseminate a normative range of financial 
supervision. Within this structure, networked power is manifest in 
determining which countries participate in setting standards and in the 
coordinated ways it compels targeted jurisdictions to establish hard law 
regimes in keeping with FATF priorities. Third, this transmission of power 
leaves little room for arguments about the basis for asserting authority over 
subject countries, except where they encroach upon interests of other 
transnational bodies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the 
World Bank—entities underwritten and led by the same countries that 
established the FATF. 
A. National Treatment Effectuates Non-Discrimination and 
Harmonization but Not Necessarily Equality 
National treatment is a principle of non-discrimination. It aims to 
ensure equal treatment among domestic and foreign financial institutions 
and to act as a vehicle for promoting fairness and standard practices across 
various segments of the financial sector.92 National treatment prioritizes 
harmonization over deregulation, preferring that a network’s weaker 
members work to improve their standards as a bulwark against transnational 
risks beyond the control of any single domestic regulator.93 While the 
national treatment framework defined the initial phases of the FATF’s 
existence, it grew out of a primary focus on harmonization and working 
through members to articulate globalized reporting obligations.94 The 
recommendations also focused on prospective regulatory subjects adjacent 
to banking institutions, including lawyers, accountants, financial advisers, 
and casinos.95 Such an outlook necessarily implied identifying jurisdictions 
were considered subpar against metrics in a process that inevitably drew 
skepticism once expressed in more coercive terms. 
B. Most Favored Nation Principle 
Borrowed from trade law, the Most Favored Nation Principle (MFN) 
requires states to treat all trading partners equally.96 Acknowledging the 
absence of any formalized MFN norm within international financial 
regulation, Zaring advances the claim that its “consensus format” 
 
 92 Zaring, Finding Legal Principle, supra note 7, at 704 (describing national treatment 
within areas such as capital adequacy requirements, international accounting principles, and 
disclosures to taxing authorities.). 
 93 Id. 
 94 William Vlcek, Surveillance to Combat Terrorist Financing in Europe: Whose 
Liberty, Whose Security?, 16 EUR. SECURITY 99 (2007). 
 95 Id. These previously excluded actors resisted being subject to reporting rules until 
9/11, when the FATF’s mandate was expanded to include combating the financiers of 
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 96 WTO, Principles of the Trading System, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
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effectively discourages any one country from exempting another state from 
existing rules or from crafting special rules for one nation to the exclusion 
of others.97 The FATF frowns on side deals among member nations, which 
is likely rooted in its homogeneous membership of like-minded constituents 
who can quickly respond to policy issues without ratification 
requirements.98 But this composition came at the cost of resentment from 
non-member states excluded from FATF activities during those critical 
periods when recommendations were being developed.99 The only option 
available for non-member states was to participate in FATF activities, but 
this was only possible after the organization was transformed from an 
informal, ad hoc entity to a fully-formed international institution.100 The 
FATF’s pattern of disparate treatment extended into its assessment systems, 
which distinguished member states from non-member states—the latter 
being grouped into nine regional bodies modelled in its image. More 
recently, the FATF has created the status of “associate members,” allowing 
specific regional bodies a greater role in FATF policymaking.101 
C. Rulemaking Instead of Adjudication 
Rulemaking within transnational networks is “talking shop’s” ultimate 
product. As a refined expression of equal treatment and an aversion to side 
deals, member countries devised a framework of desired rule regimes 
designed for domestic implementation on a voluntary basis.102 The 
preference for rules over adjudication is ostensibly consistent with the 
setting of voluntary standards, preserving flexibility for domestic 
implementation, and recognizing the lack of any centralized global 
regulator to adjudicate compliance problems.103 In the FATF context, this 
process produced a broad sweep of provisions, consisting of forty-nine 
recommendations104 and a set of best practices.105 The FATF’s forty-nine 
recommendations cover nine subtopics, the most substantive focusing on 
preventative measures, banking supervision, and law enforcement.106 The 
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recommendations ostensibly comport with the principle of voluntary norm 
setting by seeking to establish “an international standard which countries 
should implement through measures adapted to their particular 
circumstances.”107 This work complemented rulemaking exercises 
emerging from other international bodies, such as model civil and common 
law statutes prescribing provisions for mutual legal assistance, extradition 
provisions, and targeting the financing of terrorism and money 
laundering.108 
FATF recommendations are organized around themes of transparency, 
reporting, and enforcement. They create standards for due diligence in 
record keeping (particularly with respect to transactions exceeding 
$15,000),109 politically-exposed parties,110 cross-border correspondent 
banking,111 enhanced scrutiny of high-risk jurisdictions,112 reporting of 
suspicious transactions,113 and whistle-blower protections for financial 
institutions’ directors, officers, and employees.114 While the language also 
includes proposals to prohibit the misuse of “legal persons”—such as 
corporations or limited liability companies—the prohibitions are confined 
to proscriptions against money laundering and the financing of terrorism 
rather than more generalized, strategic forms of transactional secrecy.115 
The discussion below juxtaposes the FATF’s success at implementing these 
standards with the methods for securing compliance. The latter exposed 
complex hierarchical arrangements and coercive strategies at odds with the 
notion of voluntary adherence to rulemaking, as the “talking shop” 
approach to network regulation contemplates. 
D. Subsidiary Principle of Enforcement 
The Subsidiary Principle of Enforcement promotes the idea that a 
network’s member states administer and enforce internationally developed 
norms within their respective jurisdictions.116 The FATF’s structure reflects 
this ethos, consisting of a small administrative operation that relies on 
member states to carry out its work.117 American law predates the FATF, 
 
 107 Id. at 6. 
 108 IMF, Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (Aml/Cft, 
Reference Materials, https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml4.htm#law (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2020). 
 109 The FATF Recommendations, supra note 104, at 12 (Recommendation 10, Customer 
Due Diligence). 
 110 Id. at 14 (Recommendation 12, Politically Exposed Persons). 
 111 Id. (Recommendation 13, Correspondent Banking). 
 112 Id. at 17 (Recommendation 19, Higher-Risk Countries). 
 113 Id. (Recommendation 20, Reporting of Suspicious Transactions). 
 114 Id. (Recommendation 21, Tipping-Off and Confidentiality). 
 115 Id. at 21. 
 116 Zaring, Finding Legal Principle, supra note 7, at 709. 
 117 Blazejewski, supra note 88, at 9. 
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which supports the inference that U.S. statutory norms were the source of 
its recommendations. The fundamental principles in the FATF’s first forty 
recommendations align with core features of the U.S. Bank Secrecy Act 
(BSA) that was passed in 1970. The BSA required banks and other 
financial institutions to keep certain records,118 authorized the Secretary of 
the Treasury to requisition financial transactions reports from subject 
institutions and people involved in transactions for such institutions,119 and 
required the filing of Currency Transactions Reports (CTRs) on currency 
transactions exceeding $10,000.120 The BSA also imposed a “suspicious”-
transaction-reporting (STR) requirement for aggregate sums.121 
The next wave of FATF harmonization unfolded amidst the counter-
terrorism zeitgeist that followed 9/11. In October 2001, the FATF issued 
another eight additional recommendations aimed at disrupting terrorist 
financing. (A ninth was issued in October 2005.) As with the first group of 
recommendations, these also mirrored pre-existing U.S. regulations. 
Additionally, Congress quickly passed the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act, 2001)122 which, 
among other things, expanded financial reporting requirements (under Title 
III). This paralleled the hasty passage of UN Resolution 1373, which 
obligated countries to “freeze and seize” assets of people and organizations 
accused of having links to terrorists or terrorist activities.123 These changes 
sought to expand reporting requirements across the global financial 
system.124 
E. Enforcement Through Peer Review Does Not Necessarily Promote 
Equality 
Enforcement through peer review contemplates supervising network 
and non-network members as they implement standards at national and 
subnational levels, sometimes with the technical assistance of outside 
entities.125 While the FATF has formulated a system of review reflecting 
similar values, the outcome produced a less “voluntary” system of 
recommendations than Zaring’s network-based rulemaking envisions. In 
 
 118 31 C.F.R. § 5312(a)(2) (2003) (Financial institutions include, but are not limited to, 
banks and depository institutions, broker-dealers and investment companies.). 
 119 31 C.F.R. § 5313(a) (2003). 
 120 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311–14 (2011). 
 121 31 C.F.R § 1020.320 (2011). 
 122 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, H.R. 3162 (107th 
Cong. 2001–2002). 
 123 S.C. Res. 1373, (Sept. 28, 2001). 
 124 Mark Pieth, The Harmonization of Law Against Economic Crime, 1 EUR. J.L. REFORM 
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1998, the FATF began working through its member states to assess each 
other in light of best practices set out in its forty-nine recommendations.126 
Member countries started “blacklisting” Non-Cooperative Countries and 
Territories (NCCTs) for failing to comply with the FATF’s 
recommendations.127 If these designations failed to induce compliance, the 
FATF could consider other measures, such as banning certain financial 
transactions with business entities resident in the non-compliant 
jurisdictions.128 
FATF assessors use a comprehensive review protocol to: (i) determine 
compliance with recommendations; and (ii) review the effectiveness of 
domestic statutory regimes.129 The assessment methodology consists of two 
elements. The first “addresses the specific requirements of the FATF 
Recommendations, principally as they relate to the relevant legal and 
institutional framework of the country, and the powers and procedures of 
the competent authorities.”130 The second emphasizes outcomes and 
considers “the adequacy of the implementation of the FATF 
Recommendations, and identifies the extent to which a country achieves a 
defined set of outcomes that are central to a robust Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) system.”131 
At the national level, the FATF’s technical guidance looks for 
structural hallmarks of good governance, such as “political stability; a high-
level commitment to address AML/CFT issues; stable institutions with 
accountability, integrity, and transparency; the rule of law; and a capable, 
independent and efficient judicial system.”132 Assessors are also encouraged 
to use a contextualized approach to understanding the level of compliance 
with its standards.133 This approach accounts for variables such as the state 
of a particular country’s financial sector in relation to its overall economy, 
the kinds of financial institutions or products common in that sector, the 
ratio of domestic to cross-border business, and the extent of interaction with 
“high risk” jurisdictions where compliance with FATF standards is 
 
 126 FATF, FATF Members and Observers, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/#d.en.3147 (last visited Sept. 8, 2020). 
 127 Sanaa Ahmed, The Politics of Financial Regulation, 11 SOCIO-LEGAL REV. 61, 66 
(2015) [hereinafter Ahmed] (explaining how countries on the FATF’s black list find it hard 
to pay trading partners, thereby limiting the capacity to import goods); Blazejewski, supra 
note 88, at 18. 
 128 Blazejewski, supra note 88, at 18. 
 129 FATF, Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF 
Recommendations and the Effectiveness of Aml/Cft Systems at 5, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF%20Methodology%2022%20Feb%20201
3.pdf. 
 130 Id. 
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 132 Id. at 7. 
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relatively low.134 
Three themes emerge from the FATF’s structure and function. The 
first recognizes a separation of insiders and outsiders during the FATF’s 
standard-setting phase, followed by a belated inclusion of “secondary” 
actors once most of the formative work was complete.135 The second 
acknowledges the specter of hegemony growing out of relationships 
between the assessors and those countries under scrutiny.136 The third 
inference traces an uneven allocation of power and authority inside these 
networks as is evident in member states’ capacity to secure compliance 
under threat of blacklisting or more serious sanctions. The practice of 
“talking shop” passes through all of these sorting arrangements. Parties 
with more power are constantly finding ways to exert their influence over 
those with less, demonstrating how rulemaking does not instinctively 
prescribe egalitarianism or reveal internal allocations of power to outsiders. 
F. Network Governance 
As discussed in Part II of this Article, networked governance entails 
private and governmental units working with their counterparts in other 
countries across national boundaries.137 
. . . Two implications of the fit between networks and globalization are 
particularly worth noting. First, thinking about globalization from a 
disaggregated, networked perspective challenges claims about 
homogenization and centralization of power and allows for at least the 
possibility of continuing diversity in implementing common standards. But 
second, where traditional power relations continue to operate, as they surely 
must, they must now operate in a networked rather than a centralized 
context.138 
Another scholar has captured the effects of this process as it applies to 
the FATF’s development into an institution whose country evaluation 
procedures evolved into instruments of peer pressure: 
Originally an ad hoc structure that collected the pre-existing rules on 
the prevention and repression of money laundering from the Basle 
Statement of Principles (on due diligence in the financial sector) and the 
1988 Vienna Convention (on criminalization of money laundering and 
forfeiture), the FATF rapidly developed into an institution, for the first time 
 
 134 Id. 
 135 FATF, History of the FATF, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/ (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2020) (There were sixteen countries in the FATF structure. This number 
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managing to regulate and to push implementation of an entire area of law 
on a world-wide basis in less than ten years.139 
By their very nature, governance exercises require participants to form 
hierarchical relationships. But such relationships do not form easily, often 
taking shape where sovereignty assertions collide with coercive expressions 
of power expressed through the fear of ostracism.140 Locating sources of 
authority and challenging power is no easy task for the targets of networked 
regulation—a particularly sensitive topic for jurisdictions with colonial 
histories.141 The various scholarly treatments of authority vary from 
something that implies a public “surrender of private judgment”142 to the 
subject’s willingness to acknowledge that its supervising entity is somehow 
“entitled to obedience.”143 These understandings of authority imply a way 
to publicly identify sources of authority as well as the rules determining 
their application to subjects.144 
Although the FATF has convinced 200 countries and jurisdictions to 
adopt its standards,145 the organization itself has also faced governance 
challenges.146 As the FATF sought to establish more formal partnerships 
with the IMF, the latter entity was critical of the NCCT model because it 
held non-member countries to a higher assessment standard than countries 
within the FATF membership.147 The IMF was especially concerned about 
the disparate treatment of developing economies.148 These particular 
jurisdictions were already subject to pre-existing oversights through the 
 
 139 Pieth, supra note 124, at 531. 
 140 SLAUGHTER, supra note 13, at 196. 
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al. eds., 1999). 
 143 R.B. Friedman, On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy, in AUTHORITY 
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Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC).149 Developed 
by the IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) and the World 
Bank, ROSC was designed to assess countries against twelve benchmarks 
with a view towards improving their financial systems.150 NCCT protocols 
conflicted with ROSC models in three respects. The ROSC procedures: (i) 
provided a right of reply whereas NCCT protocols did not; (ii) considered 
the various stages of economic development across subject countries; and 
(iii) took into account the progress of subject countries toward becoming 
fully compliant with desired norms.151 The FATF eventually modified its 
NCCT process by taking on more adjudicative features.152 
The IMF, along with the World Bank, eventually worked to resolve 
conflicts between the FATF and developing countries. These efforts led to 
the creation of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the 
oldest regional body.153 Formed in 1990, the CFATF opposed FATF 
recommendations targeting offshore financial centers in the Caribbean.154 
The CFATF adopted its own nineteen recommendations, known as the 
Aruba Recommendations, which it felt better reflected the region’s 
needs.155 Although it submitted to FATF assessment processes, the CFATF 
demanded that its own nineteen recommendations be used in the 
exercise.156 By 2003, the FATF—with IMF support—invited the CFATF to 
participate in the review of its recommendations. Only after this process 
was complete did the CFATF express its willingness to unconditionally 
accept revised recommendations.157 The CFATF is now an associate 
member of the FATF. 
G. Leveraging Existing Networks as Instruments of Transnational Power 
Through the FATF, the United States and its allies have successfully 
used disaggregated soft power to globalize financial reporting standards. 
Despite this power’s varying degrees of coercion, its harmonizing effects 
have brought a measure of consistency to our international financial 
networks, contributing to the effort to reduce systemic risk. Even with its 
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imperfections, the FATF may be the space where transnational financial 
networks might devise new rules that target regulatory subjects outside the 
spheres of terrorist finance or money laundering; yet, it may nonetheless 
attract limits on the free movement of its assets, owing to disputes in which 
there is a compelling public interest. Part IV uses recent opioid litigation as 
the basis for exploring this argument. 
IV. OPIOID LITIGATION DEFENDANTS AND THEIR TRAIL OF 
INTERNATIONAL WIRE TRANSFERS 
This Part describes the Opioid crisis in detail in order to demonstrate 
the magnitude of the harm, as well as the incredible and continuing harm, 
caused by a failure to properly regulate untraceable offshore wire transfers 
that, as a result, may be unreachable by plaintiffs. 
A. Locating Profiteers (and Their Profits) Amidst a Complex Crisis 
As the opioid crisis continues to take its human and financial toll on 
Americans, relationships between its profiteers and their banking 
institutions have passed without much comment. This oversight is all the 
more striking given the size and complexity of the litigation as well as the 
scale of profit-making that was inured to the benefit of drug manufacturers 
and their beneficial owners.158 Naturally, the plaintiffs seek to recover 
billions in opioid-related public health expenditures from the companies 
that made these drugs. More specifically, the plaintiffs allege these drug 
makers were aggressive and deceptive in marketing these drugs to 
healthcare-provider consumers while downplaying or denying their 
addictive qualities. Disagreement exists regarding how to interpret “vector-
based” arguments, which revolve around the idea that prescribing opioids to 
treat legitimate pain management is a kind of “gateway” for patients who 
would become addicted and eventually seek out alternative drugs once 
denied access to originally-prescribed medications.159 Recent scholarship 
questions the merits of pursuing civil or criminal proceedings against 
 
 158 A “beneficial owner” refers to any natural person who ultimately owns or controls a 
legal entity or arrangement, such as a corporation or a trust. 
 159 Nicolas P. Terry, The Opioid Litigation Unicorn, 70 S. C. L. REV. 637, 652 (2019) 
[hereinafter Terry] (arguing that the vector model is a “simple cause and effect model to 
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health inequities.”). See Patricia Zettler, Margaret Foster Riley & Aaron S. Kesselheim, 
Implementing a Public Health Perspective in FDA Drug Regulation, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
221, 235 (2018) [hereinafter Zettler, et al.] (This view supports the inference of the vector 
theory.) (“In 2016, forty percent of all opioid related deaths in the U.S., roughly 16,000 
people, were due to prescription opioids. An estimated two million people misuse or are 
dependent on prescription opioids. Many of the individuals who have moved on to stronger 
illicit drugs like heroin and fentanyl began by misusing prescription opioids.”). 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 41:1 (2020) 
30 
manufacturers instead of prioritizing systemic reform.160 It further suggests 
that blaming manufacturers supports a narrative that eclipses responsibility 
borne by other participants in the drug supply chain.161 Another line of 
discussion contrasts historical claims against tobacco companies (that 
operated in unregulated markets) with more contemporary opioid litigation 
posture in an industry where extensive regulatory approvals could afford 
important tort defenses.162 Commentary has also focused on changes to 
federal drug approval mechanisms that might impact supply-side 
behavior.163 
The foregoing arguments continue against the backdrop of a 
staggering death toll and enormous public costs incurred in responding to 
this crisis. About 450,000 Americans died from opioid overdoses between 
1999 and 2018.164 In the five-year period between 2013 and 2018, the 
federal government spent $129 billion on law enforcement and treatment 
initiatives.165 This amount does not include state and local expenditures, 
which account for most of the plaintiffs participating in opioid litigation 
across the country.166 Nor does it account for derivative economic impacts, 
such as diminished labor participation, increased child welfare costs, and 
lost tax revenues, which some estimate would bring the total cost closer to 
$504 billion.167 
B. Opioids and the Evolution of Markets for Pain Management 
Medications 
Derived from the opium poppy, opioids bind receptors in the body that 
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help regulate pain and emotions. A wide range of medications use opioid 
analgesics to relieve acute pain by “action on the μ opioid receptor—the 
major analgesic opioid receptor expressed throughout the nervous 
system.”168 Since Friedrich Sertürner successfully isolated morphine from 
crude opium in 1803, there has been a steady increase in the varieties of 
opioid analgesics, chemical composition, means of administration, and 
abilities to bind to opioid receptors.169 The duration of effects vary within 
this class of drugs—either because of “intrinsic properties of the opioid 
molecule” or “pharmaceutical formulation.”170 
Although opioids have been available in the United States since the 
nineteenth century, the 1990s marked a turning point in demand for the pain 
management solutions in the healthcare marketplace.171 Much of this 
demand was rooted in the challenges of treating pain. One group of authors 
described the problem succinctly: 
Pain is the perception manifest from nociceptive stimuli in internal 
tissues and external insults detected by peripheral sensors in the body. It is a 
complex physiologic process, involving many different forms of pain 
encoded by a number of neural circuits. Pain may be expressed in numerous 
forms, for example, stabbing, pricking, burning or aching, and may also 
produce diverse emotions and sensations. Pain also arises in multiple 
clinical contexts, and each context, and sometimes each individual patient, 
raises specific issues that need to be addressed in distinct ways.172 
Pain’s emergence as an important clinical concern centered on 
problems with it being largely under-assessed, under-treated, and 
unnoticed.173 As patient advocates increased pressure on healthcare systems 
to treat pain symptoms with opioids, they relied on a small and frequently 
cited body of contemporary literature suggesting the risk of addiction is 
low.174 These arguments gained considerable support in 1995 when Dr. 
James Campbell famously outlined arguments for treating pain as a fifth 
“vital sign” during his Presidential Address to the American Pain Society 
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(APS).175 Campbell’s concept of devising pain management metrics quickly 
gained traction, prompting the APS to develop pain evaluation systems for 
use in assessing vital signs.176 Within the next decade, expectations 
surrounding pain management crystalized into obligations that could 
implicate licensure of institutions and physicians alike. Such obligations 
required healthcare organizations to improve their pain management 
practices,177 and the Federation of State Medical Boards recommended that 
state boards consider sanctioning health professionals who did not 
adequately treat pain.178 
But pressures from outside and within the medical community did not 
immediately translate into better clinical outcomes—owing to pain’s varied 
origins and impacts on individual patients.179 Nonetheless, prescription 
rates continued to climb, as did the potency of analgesics prescribed.180 The 
number of Americans experiencing some form of pain—and expectations 
that the medical community tend to their discomfort—became so 
widespread that the growing demand for pain care was eventually reflected 
in the number of prescriptions being filled.181 By 2012, primary care 
physicians, who commonly had a basic understanding of pain management, 
produced nearly 49% of all opioid prescriptions.182 During this period, 
specialists were also using opioids across a variety of clinical contexts, 
ranging from surgical and post-operative care to treat “acute injuries, such 
as those due to household, sporting, or motor vehicle accidents.”183 
C. Purdue Pharma’s Marketing Practices and the Gateway Theory of 
Liability 
Recognizing a lucrative market for pain treatment medications, drug 
makers pursued a multi-faceted strategy designed to steer demand toward 
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their products. Common practices included sending sales representatives to 
meet with healthcare providers, issuing samples to patients and their 
doctors, funding professional development programs, paying “thought 
leaders” to promote drugs, and coordinating with patient advocacy 
groups.184 These tactics coincided with myriad institutional pressures on 
physicians and healthcare to address their patients’ pain management 
demands. 
Soon after its 1995 release of an oxycodone product known as 
OxyContin, drug maker Purdue emerged to become one of the more 
infamous actors in the marketing of analgesics. OxyContin was novel in 
that it was an “extended-release” product, which indicated a twelve-hour 
dosing schedule at a time when most other products were administered 
every four to six hours.185 Between 1996 and 2000, Purdue promoted the 
drug in several ways, some of which were hosting more than forty 
conferences for a total of 5000 healthcare professionals—including doctors, 
nurses and pharmacists—and doubling its sales force.186 Purdue worked 
through these marketing strategies to enlist the medical community’s 
support for its products while offering assurances that OxyContin could 
relieve pain with minimal risk to patients. OxyContin sales subsequently 
skyrocketed, growing from $44 million and 316,000 prescriptions in 1996 
to more than $1 billion by the year 2000.187 Sales reached $3 billion in 
2001–2002 with 14 million issued prescriptions.188 Additionally, 
OxyContin prescriptions unrelated to cancer treatments grew from 670,000 
to 6.2 million between 1996 and 2002.189 Throughout these time frames, 
Purdue’s promotional material maintained the position that OxyContin 
posed little to no risk of addiction.190 
Increased prescription rates combined with insufficient regard for the 
risk of addiction produced tragic effects. Between 1999 and 2018, more 
than 232,000 Americans died from prescription opioid overdoses.191 The 
oxycodone family of drugs (including OxyContin), along with methadone 
and hydrocodone, have been the prescribed opioids mostly commonly 
connected to overdose deaths.192 According to the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), deaths from prescription opioids 
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quadrupled during this same period.193 Despite a steady decline in overall 
prescribing rates since 2012, prescription opioids were linked to 32% of 
overdose deaths in 2018.194 One possible explanation for this linkage may 
be the potency of prescriptions—expressed in morphine milligram 
equivalents (MME)—which has increased threefold since 1999.195 In the 
face of mounting death tolls and concern from public health experts, Purdue 
ceased its marketing practices—by which time it had generated $2.8 billion 
in revenue from the sale of OxyContin (between January 1996 and June 
2001).196 As early as 2004, lawsuits against Purdue and other defendants 
began springing up all over the United States and in Canada.197 The most 
notable litigation involved three of Purdue’s senior officers who reached 
plea agreements with the Department of Justice. On May 10, 2007, 
Purdue’s President and CEO (Michael Fridman), its Chief Legal Officer 
(Howard R. Udell), and its Chief Scientific Officer (Dr. Paul Goldenheim) 
pled guilty to the introduction of a misbranded drug into interstate 
commerce contrary to 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 352(a), and 333(a)(2). 
According to the agreed statement of facts: 
The Purdue Frederick Company, Inc., and the three executives have 
admitted that Purdue fraudulently marketed OxyContin by falsely claiming 
that OxyContin was less addictive, less subject to abuse, and less likely to 
cause withdrawal symptoms than other pain medications when there was no 
medical research to support these claims and without Food and Drug 
Administration approval of these claims.198 
In addition to paying a $600 million fine to the federal government, 
Purdue also entered into a civil settlement, which imposed exclusion from 
taking part in federal healthcare programs for twenty-five years.199 
As already discussed, tort claims against opioid drug makers are 
premised on the “gateway” theory of liability, which is organized around 
the idea that opioid prescriptions—regardless of their underlying legitimate 
purpose—function as a pathway to other forms of addiction. It presupposes 
that opioid prescriptions administered without regard for their addictive 
qualities will induce dependency and misuse among patients, who, in turn, 
seek other kinds of drugs after being cut off from their original, physician-
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supervised opioid doses. This, combined with evidence of deceptive 
marketing practices, undoubtedly prompted a great deal of litigation. While 
these untested arguments remain the subject of some debate, the CDC’s 
three-phase historical narrative of the crisis offers some support to gateway 
theorists: the first phase began with a rise in opioid prescriptions in the 
1990s; a second was defined by increases in heroin-related overdose deaths, 
which began in 2010; and a third was marked by a climb in overdose deaths 
involving synthetic opioids—such as fentanyl—beginning in 2013.200 
Taken together, these arguments have been central to the legal theory 
underlying opioid litigation claims against drug manufacturers. 
D. Offshoring OxyContin Revenues and the Rising Tide of Opioid 
Litigation 
Local governments’ experience with the 1998 Master Settlement 
Agreement (MSA) between major tobacco companies and forty-six states 
have also shaped current opioid litigation strategy.201 The MSA’s terms 
provided that states would receive more than $206 billion over twenty-five 
years in what remains the largest civil litigation settlement in history.202 
While part of the agreement’s central purpose was to fund programs related 
to smoking cessation, litigation proceeds often found their way into general 
spending.203 In many states, these proceeds failed to reach local government 
agencies on the front lines of public health.204 Anxious to ensure history 
would not repeat itself with opioid-related claims, local governments began 
filing their own claims against drug makers, producing a large and diverse 
plaintiff class.205 While varied among states, counties, cities, and tribal 
nations, their claims mimicked a dozen settled state and federal suits that 
focused on “overpromotion and diversion.”206 More specifically, they 
argued that (i) drug makers downplayed the addictive effects of opioids 
while exaggerating their benefits, and (ii) distributors did not have 
sufficient controls in place to identify suspicious orders made on behalf of 
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so-called “pill mills” and other heavy subscribers.207 
In December of 2017, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation (USJPM) determined all claims involved shared questions of 
fact, and that it would consolidate and transfer hundreds of federal claims to 
the Northern District of Ohio before U.S. District Judge Daniel Polster.208 
Additional plaintiffs joined the proceedings and Purdue alone was named in 
more than 2600 suits.209 Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) processes aim to 
reserve litigants’ resources by preventing duplicative discovery procedures 
and conflicting pretrial rulings.210 “Transferred actions not terminated in the 
transferee district are remanded to their originating transferor districts by 
the Panel at or before the conclusion of centralized pretrial proceedings.”211 
These proceedings will often hear representative trials to refine some of the 
justiciable issues of interest to all parties.212 
After a year of settlement negotiations, Purdue reached a tentative 
agreement in September of 2019 “with critical and important constituents” 
that would resolve outstanding claims through bankruptcy proceedings.213 
In tandem with these proceedings, Purdue proposed a three-part resolution 
structure, which it claimed would provide “unprecedented transfer of value 
to the American people.”214 These terms provided that: 
(1) Purdue’s existing shareholders will relinquish all of their equity 
interests in the Debtors and consent to the transfer of all of the Debtors’ 
assets to a trust or similar post-emergence structure for the benefit of 
claimants and the U.S. public, “free and clear” of Purdue’s liabilities to the 
fullest extent permitted by law; 
(2) Purdue’s existing shareholders will engage in a sale process for 
their ex-U.S. pharmaceutical companies; and 
(3) Purdue’s existing shareholders will contribute an additional $3 
billion over seven years. . .with the hope of substantial further contemplated 
contributions from the sales of their ex-U.S. pharmaceutical businesses.215 
Purdue’s terms were met with criticism—New York Attorney General 
Letitia James called them “insulting” and several states refused to 
participate in the settlement.216 Attempting to properly contextualize 
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proposed settlement amounts, she sought discovery of documents that 
would help determine the extent of assets under the control of Purdue and 
its beneficial owners—the Sackler family. In September of 2019, court 
filings revealed that members of the Sackler family had executed more than 
800 wire transfers—representing an aggregate of nearly $1 billion—into 
entities in the Channel Islands using Swiss bank accounts and that these 
transactions took place as recently as 2018.217 Financial institutions 
involved in these transactions included: “Bank of America, N.A., Charles 
Schwab & Co., Inc., Citibank, N.A., Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, HSBC 
Bank USA, N.A., J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Morgan Stanley & Co. 
LLC, UBS Financial Services, Inc., and Wells Fargo.”218 None of the 
entities described in these wire transfers appear in Purdue’s organizational 
chart attached to the Debtor’s Informational Brief as “Exhibit A.”219 At the 
very least, these records suggest Purdue and the Sacklers were trying to 
“lowball” plaintiffs to the extent that they were not entirely forthcoming 
about the extent of their assets during the course of settlement negotiations. 
In a revealing statement to National Public Radio (NPR), a Sackler family 
spokesperson insisted, “There is nothing newsworthy about these decade-
old transfers, which were perfectly legal and appropriate in every 
respect . . . .”220 A clearer picture of these wire transfers subsequently 
emerged when auditors discovered the Sackler family had withdrawn more 
than $10.7 billion from Purdue since 2008.221 Their timing suggests the 
Sacklers accelerated the pace of these transactions in an attempt to protect 
most of their wealth at a point in time when there was good reason to 
anticipate large-scale litigation. 
E. The Failures of “Talking Shop” During the Arc of Time Spanning Wire 
Transfers Between Purdue and Its Beneficial Owners 
Information surrounding the 2019 release of transactional details 
between Purdue and entities controlled by the Sackler family point to a 
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pattern of wire transfers that began in 1989, if not sooner.222 Financial 
institutions readily offered up their services in helping to decapitalize 
Purdue during important points in the respective trajectories of private 
wealth accumulation, efforts at targeting particular kinds of financial 
secrecy, and the FATF’s evolution. The wire transfers at issue in the opioid 
story were legal and thus outside the FATF’s remit. This remained the case 
after 2007, when Purdue paid a $600 million fine in connection with its 
deceptive marketing practices. Whether one accepts the “gateway” theory 
of liability or gives more weight to socioeconomics and other determinants 
of vulnerability to opioid-induced dependency, Purdue and its beneficial 
owners continued profiting from OxyContin sales past the point where 
primary and derivative forms of dependency were costing lives. 
There is much irony in the profits of this misery passing through 
American banking institutions while U.S. regulators worked through the 
FATF to develop and enforce recommendations aimed at limiting financial 
secrecy out of concern for the common good. There was also a compelling 
public interest in the “Purdue-Sackler” wire transfers. Representing more 
than just the fruits of misery-making on a large scale, these transactions 
reveal a particular set of networked institutional arrangements existing 
within a globalizing regulatory landscape where targeting proceeds of crime 
and the financing of terrorism became top priorities. Had they been street-
level drug pushers or terrorists responsible for tens of thousands of deaths, 
there is little doubt members of the Sackler family would have been 
prosecuted, jailed, and subject to asset seizure. But such moral and legal 
calculations change when the “overpromotion and distribution” of highly 
addictive drugs operates through skillfully arranged business entities and a 
federally regulated drug supply chain. Over the same period of time that 
banking institutions were being asked to refine reporting rules that would 
help governments seize proceeds of crime, at least a dozen worked with 
Purdue’s beneficial owners’ offshore capital under circumstances 
substantively adjacent to the FATF’s work. 
“Talking shop’s” failures inside the FATF ecosystem extend into the 
relationships between America’s national and subnational public actors. 
The delegates purporting to represent the country’s interests within 
international settings devised regulatory structures to promote financial 
transparency in ways that undermined the interests of their state and local 
counterparts—counterparts who accounted for most of the plaintiffs suing 
Purdue and the Sackler family.223 Put another way, those capable of 
leveraging soft law power underperformed at critical moments when they 
might have used networked regulation to put restrictions around more 
diverse forms of capital flight. Part V reimagines contents of the FATF’s 
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recommendations and technical guidance documents with these arguments 
in mind. 
V. PUBLIC INTEREST TRANSACTIONS AND THE BUILDING OF 
TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY STRUCTURES FOR NETWORKS 
WITHIN NETWORKS 
This Part explains why wire transfers originating from Purdue to its 
beneficial owners fall outside the FATF and thus explains the need for 
either additional standards or new interpretive guidelines that meaningfully 
give effect to the FATF’s mandate. 
A. The FATF’s Evolution 
There is nothing new or radical in the proposal to refine the 
interpretive scope and direction of FATF recommendations. The FATF first 
reviewed its mandate in 2004,224 adopted a new surveillance process in 
2006,225 and revised its mandate a second time in 2008.226 The FATF also 
produced a series of responses following the 2009 meeting of G-20 
countries in Pittsburgh, where countries “called on the FATF to improve 
transparency and exchange of information” and to issue a list of “high risk 
jurisdictions.”227 The following year, the FATF developed guidelines for 
insurance companies, cross-border transport of cash and bearer bonds, tax 
amnesty laws, and asset repatriation.228 In the same year, it published 
reports on free trade zones and their potential vulnerability to misuse for 
money laundering or the financing of terrorism.229 The November 2010 G-
20 Summit in Seoul produced a similar “call and response,” with member 
states urging the FATF to “update and implement” FATF standards 
pertaining to “transparency of cross-border wire transfers, beneficial 
ownership, customer due diligence, and due diligence for ‘politically 
exposed persons.’”230 At the G-20 summit in 2016 in Hangzhou, China, 
leaders similarly stated their continued support for “protecting the integrity 
of the international financial system,” calling on the FATF to “improve the 
implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on 
the availability of beneficial ownership information of legal persons and 
legal arrangements, and its international exchange.”231 The G-20 finance 
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ministers and central bank governors, who met in July 2013 and November 
2015, echoed prior sentiments and refrains, with both events producing 
some form of commentary about tackling “the risks raised by opacity of 
legal persons and legal arrangements.”232 
B. The Ambiguity of the “Purdue-Sackler” Wire Transfers 
Properly contextualized, the wire transfers between Purdue and its 
beneficial owners (the “Purdue-Sackler” wire transfers) fall outside FATF 
scrutiny for reasons that are logical yet problematic. FATF standards that 
target the financing of terrorism, for example, recognize the costs 
associated with planning, training, travel, and buying any materials used to 
carry out attacks.233 Accounting for debates about their efficacy, these 
standards seek to disrupt the financing of such activity in the name of 
public safety. But these provisions are qualitatively mismatched with 
features of the Purdue-Sackler wire transfers. Despite their relationship to 
opioid deaths and other forms of large-scale social disruption, their 
particular features bear no substantive relationship to “terrorism,” whatever 
disagreements persist about how to define the term.234 
More complex problems exist within the FATF’s definition of money 
laundering: “the processing of . . . criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal 
origin.”235 This definition requires that targeted funds have some cognizable 
relationship to the commission of a known crime. This framework 
precludes a wider conceptualization of money laundering—one that 
involves payments routed through offshore jurisdictions and bank accounts 
to obscure their provenance or ultimate payee. Whether the Purdue-Sackler 
wire transfers constitute proceeds of crime remains unclear. On July 23, 
2007, Purdue pled guilty to “misbranding OxyContin, a prescription opioid 
pain medication, with the intent to defraud or mislead, a felony under the 
federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.”236 But the order accepting the 
guilty plea is silent on the legal treatment of future Purdue proceeds arising 
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from opioid sales and limits its chronological focus to the period running 
from “December 12, 1995 . . . to on or about June 30, 2001.”237 This 
language supports the inference that the $600 million in fines was imposed 
for conduct carried out during the same period without expressly capturing 
a corresponding time frame for revenues derived from the underlying 
crime. 
In plea agreements executed in connection with the May 2007 
proceedings, the federal prosecutors agreed “there will be no further 
criminal prosecution or forfeiture action by the United States for any 
violations of law, occurring before May 10, 2007, pertaining to OxyContin 
that was the subject matter of the investigation . . . .”238 The benefits of this 
undertaking applied to Purdue’s beneficial owners and related entities.239 
More recently, the media has reported that Purdue was in talks with the 
federal government to resolve ongoing civil and criminal probes as recently 
as September 2019.240 
C. Confronting the Discordant Interests Among Three Networked 
Constituencies 
To the extent that the “talking shop” approach to transnational 
rulemaking has been underutilized, it also represents an unexplored 
opportunity to envision further interpretive changes to FATF standards. The 
FATF also expresses its institutional priorities in what it chooses not to do 
as a network that places a premium on particular forms of financial 
surveillance that accord with its mandate. It has yet to set its sights on how 
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certain unexamined features of other networked relationships fetter the 
fulfillment of its fundamental purpose. The Purdue-Sackler transfers are 
problematic because of their ties to the opioid crisis and their ostensibly 
legal nature in relation to U.S. law and FATF standards. Moreover, sub-
state actors—such as the governmental opioid plaintiffs—cannot easily 
lobby for changes to existing FATF practices or their domestic iterations 
under national law without coordinated support from a federal government 
whose vague posture vis-a-vis these wire transfers sits uneasily alongside 
its antipathy toward multilateral engagement. State and local plaintiffs must 
also contend with powerful defendants—mostly members of the influential 
pharmaceutical industry whose banking institutions stand ready to provide 
the kinds of asset protection strategies at issue in this Article. The Purdue-
Sackler wire transfers are a consequence of these relationships, which 
remain outside the reach of the FATF’s purview by virtue of the interface 
between existing rules and the asset-protection strategies currently beyond 
their reach. 
D. Refinements Towards Developing a Public Interest Transaction 
Much has been written about the social contract in relation to financial 
regulation.241 However construed, its constituent elements must include 
regulations that facilitate access to accountability from those who 
contribute to social harms on a large scale. In a globalized context, these 
elements must also use transnational networks to extend their reach beyond 
borders in order to keep pace with the modern realities of capital mobility. 
Given their timing and context, the Purdue-Sackler wire transfers offer a 
prototypical example of a globalized problem that awaits a globalized 
solution. With modest changes, the FATF is best suited to regulate such 
capital flows, given its mandate and infrastructure. As a threshold matter, 
the FATF should establish a new class of “Public Interest Transaction,” 
(PIT) defined as “any transnational movement of capital that represents 
earnings directly or indirectly derived from crimes or other practices that 
cause substantial harm to the public good and in which there is a 
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governmental plaintiff.” This definition consists of five core elements, 
which can interface with the existing complex of FATF recommendations 
and underlying technical manuals to produce outcomes that give fuller 
meaning to the institution’s purpose. 
1. A Cross-Border Dimension 
The PIT framework recognizes a causal relationship between various 
public harms, its profiteers, and the financial institutions that help move 
resulting profits offshore. This approach complements the language in 
FATF Recommendations 24 and 25, which calls for measures to prevent 
misuses of “legal persons” and “legal arrangements”, respectively.242 The 
outcomes tied to these recommendations envision degrees of access to 
information about legal entities and their beneficial owners such that new 
types of triggering events will mandate important disclosures regulators 
consider useful in tracking PIT-related capital flows.243 
2. Standing for Subnational Government 
Legislation defining the PIT’s construction of “government” should 
expressly contemplate a role for subnational regulators to institute legal 
action and enjoy the benefit of coordination with federal regulators such as 
FinCEN. Such an outlook is in keeping with classical expressions of 
network theory, as expressed in Part II of this Article.244 It also reflects the 
notion that transnational networks need not presumptively exclude state 
actors at the local or regional levels.245 This iteration of government also 
recognizes a particular class of plaintiffs with the standing to advocate for 
the public interest in the wake of socially-harmful events occurring at more 
localized levels, such as oil spills, collapsed mines, or chemical spills 
resulting from derailments. 
3. The Perpetual Discoverability and Attachment of Proceeds 
FATF member states should legislatively recognize a PIT doctrine that 
preserves plaintiffs’ rights to pursue profits of socially-harmful practices 
without regard to the timing of regulatory proceedings, be they civil, 
criminal, or some hybrid of the two. For example, impugned conduct may 
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generate proceeds that come to light long after any court proceedings have 
concluded. The completion of proceedings should not bar plaintiffs from 
pursuing targeted funds so long as they can establish those moneys were 
earned from the underlying conduct or otherwise traceable to it—especially 
if there is evidence of non-compliance with statutory provisions 
promulgated in compliance with FATF Recommendations 24 and 25. 
4. An Emphasis on Principles-Based Approaches to Transactional 
Scrutiny 
Rather than define an exhaustive list of triggering events, legislating a 
framework around PITs should be rooted in principles-based regulation. 
This approach to financial regulation is well-established and reinforces the 
merits of accounting for the limitless scenarios that may warrant 
government action while still building a sustainable and effective 
compliance culture among regulees.246 It is a form of “flexible regulation” 
that favors a context-dependent paradigm rather than a prescriptive model 
of rulemaking.247 One scholar aptly described it as integrating “community 
norms, individual morality, market forces, market or media pressure, and 
any other forces that can help strengthen the arm of regulation.”248 In the 
PIT context, this principle sidesteps complications that arise where 
otherwise problematic transactions fall outside a fixed set of prohibited 
activities despite engaging concerns that warrant regulatory intervention. 
 
 
 246 See, e.g., Rachelle Y. Holmes, Deconstructing the Rules of Corporate Tax, 25 AKRON 
TAX J. 1, 2 (2010) (arguing that “a systemic focus and commitment by lawmakers to a more 
principles-based approach to regulation would significantly mitigate many of the challenges 
currently encumbering the U.S. tax regime”); Ruth O. Kuras, Harmonization of Securities 
Regulation Standards between Canada and the United States, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 
465 (2004) (comparing the American and Canadian approaches to principles-based 
regulation); John T. Lynch, Credit Derivatives: Industry Initiative Supplants Need for Direct 
Regulatory Intervention—A Model for the Future of U.S. Regulation, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1371, 
1420 (2008) (describing how the U.K.’s Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (CCMR) 
called for “domestic coordination and the recognition of the need for greater international 
regulatory cooperation can best be achieved by the shift to a more harmonized principles-
based form of regulation rather than trying to synchronize numerous extensive sets of 
prescriptive rules”); Harvey L. Pitt, Bringing Financial Services Regulation into the Twenty-
First Century, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 315 (2008) (arguing in favor of principles-based 
regulation generally). See also Paul D. Paton, Rethinking the Role of the Auditor: Resolving 
the Audit/Tax Services Debate, 32 QUEEN’S L.J. 135 (2006). 
 247 Cristie Ford, Financial Innovation and Flexible Regulation: Destabilizing the 
Regulatory State, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 27 (2013) [hereinafter Ford, Financial 
Innovation]. 
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E. Reimagining a Different Approach to the Purdue-Sackler Wire 
Transfers 
The Purdue-Sackler wire transfers occurred over a period of time 
when the rising prospect of litigation stemming from Purdue’s role in the 
opioid crisis created a strong incentive to place assets offshore as a 
protective strategy. Once the PIT model is embedded into the FATF’s 
existing body of recommendations and member countries’ laws, it is worth 
contemplating their corresponding impact on the regulatory calculus 
surrounding these transactions. The goal is to imagine a different course of 
events in how financial institutions behave both in relation to Purdue’s 
assets and reimagined laws in FATF member countries. 
Once public health experts began sounding the alarm about opioid 
deaths from different parts of the United States, local authorities would 
have started investigating the source of the problem. These efforts would 
have uncovered information about actors within the drug supply chain, 
including their legal structures and beneficial owners. The five federal249 
and four state agencies250 engaged in the investigations preceding Purdue’s 
2007 guilty plea are evidence that sufficient statutory authority for 
interagency cooperation exists to support the language in FATF 
Recommendation 31.251 The fruits of this cooperation should generate, at a 
minimum, information outlining the nature of the underlying public interest 
problem, the actors involved, the structure of their business entities, and a 
notice of intent to commence legal proceedings. Parties named in these 
investigations should receive notice of any submissions and be afforded the 
opportunity to comment. 
Pending any further decisions as to the disposition of seized funds, 
federal regulators should ask entities named in any investigation to disclose 
beneficial owners, all domestic and offshore entities under their control, and 
information confirming the names of their respective financial institutions. 
These disclosures should be reviewed against information from the Internal 
Revenue Service. The named financial institutions should provide all 
records generated in the ordinary course of compliance with existing FATF 
requirements and comparator provisions under American law. The most 
relevant provisions govern customer due diligence,252 record keeping,253 
 
 249 These included the Food and Drug Administration, Office of Criminal Investigations; 
Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation; Department of Health and Human Services 
Office of Inspector General; Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General; and Defense 
Criminal Investigative Service. 
 250 These included the Virginia Attorney General’s Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, 
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 251 International Standards on Combating Money Laundering, supra note 242, at 23 
(discussing Recommendation 31, Powers of Law Enforcement and Investigative 
Authorities). 
 252 Id. at 12 (discussing Recommendation 10, Customer Due Diligence); 31 CFR Parts 
1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, and 1026; 81 FR 29397. 
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correspondent banking,254 and wire transfers.255 The targeted entity’s assets 
should be subject to a form of asset seizure once originating jurisdictions 
can establish their connection to a cognizable and sufficiently described 
harm. Any subsequent filings generated in connection with the cross-border 
movement of funds deemed to be proceeds of the PIT should require banks 
to freeze any further outbound capital flows consistent with the U.S. 
statutory equivalent of FATF Recommendation 4, pending resolution of any 
outstanding legal claims to such funds.256 Existing mutual legal assistance 
commitments with relevant foreign jurisdictions (in accordance with FATF 
Recommendations 37 and 38) should complement these asset freezes.257 
The foregoing framework offers two important benefits. First, it 
prevents beneficial owners from strategically decapitalizing defendant 
businesses at points in time when their conduct has produced the kinds of 
harms that engage public interest. Linking this restraint to a principles-
based framework that considers “community norms, individual morality, 
market forces, market or media pressure, and any other forces” engenders a 
compliance culture that need not be at odds with regulatory certainty.258 The 
second advantage revolves around the contours of litigation settlement 
negotiations, which would shift once a clearer picture of the defendant’s 
assets was known and was within the plaintiff’s reach. This would have 
undoubtedly had an impact on Purdue’s fall 2019 offer to pay a $3 billion 
settlement and relinquish control of its entities, which assumed a 
qualitatively different meaning once the extent to which their 
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decapitalization strategy came into clearer focus.259 Both of these 
advantages reinforce what should be an important element of the social 
contract—one that gives communities meaningful access to redress 
mechanisms while encouraging better practices among regulees. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The FATF’s historical trajectory demonstrates how the “talking shop” 
framework has the capacity to produce transnational frameworks whose 
outcomes can find their way into expressions of hard law. Despite pressures 
to broaden its mandate, the fettering of its power and leaving certain 
problematic forms of asset mobility unaddressed continues to undermine its 
mission. Admittedly, PITs are unlike terrorism and entail different 
formulations of risk and psychological impact that prompt rapid 
institutional responses. 
But there is a vital role for soft law in helping to connect this new 
concept to existing recommendations and standards to produce an outcome 
that better represents the FATF’s original purpose. Regulators should 
address demands for covert movements of capital mobility that represent 
profits traceable to a limitless range of events, including environmental or 
air disasters, financial crises, the politicized depletion of national treasuries, 
and general corruption. 
As long as governments fail to take action on this front, they will 
preserve the opportunism that continues to make secrecy jurisdictions 
attractive options for those who profit from catastrophic events in ways that 
destroy our social fabric. Properly deployed, “talking shop” can generate 
the soft law that emerges from transnational networks to generate consensus 
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